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Scientific Principles Versus Practical 
Realities: lnsights From Organizational 
Theory to Individual Psychological 
Assessment 
UTE-CHRISTINE KLEHE 
Unjversity of Amsterdam 
Individual psychological assessment (IPA) 
for executive and top management posi­
tions isn't an easy job. Still, knowledge 
gained over decades of scientific study 
suggests that we rely on structured job 
and organizational analyses; the construc­
tion of appropriate high- and low-fidelity 
simulations, cognitive tests, and affective 
inventories suitable in content and diffi­
culty (Ones & Dilchert, 2009; Rubenzer, 
Faschingbauer, & Ones, 2000); as well as a 
structured and mechanical combination of 
the resulting information (fEgisd6ttir et al., 
2006; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nel­
son, 2000). And we will likely stili remain 
painfully aware of the poor ability of even 
our most refined assessments for predicting 
executives' performance. 
Silzer and jeanneret (2011) "disagree 
with those who have a simplistic view of 
executive roles" and argue that they "do 
not think a job-sampling approach to estab­
lish job relatedness [ . . .  ] is feasible, given 
the complexity of executive jobs and the sig­
nificant influence of contextual factors" and 
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Many (though not all) of the ideas voiced in this 
commentary are based on Kiehe (2004), which in turn 
is largely based on Oliver (1991) and has found first 
empirical support by Konig, Klehe, Berchtold, and 
Kleinmann (201 0). 
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that "test batteries would only evaluate indi-
viduals on very general factors (mostly cog­
nitive factors) that are far too broad to differ­
entiate specific executive success." Rather, 
they stress the expertise of the assessing 
psychologist and "the clinician's 'genuine 
creative! act' of generating a 'structural­
dynamic hypothesis'," arguing for asses­
sors' proposed ability to sort and integrate 
observations in multiple ways, to identify 
"broken: legs" and to adapt the focus of the 
testing to the information so far received. 
l\-1any' reasons may explain why even 
scientist-practitioners discard the advice of 
their own discipline, ranging from implicit 
beliefs (Highhouse, 2008), classic attribu­
tion errors, and decision-making biases 
(Phillips. & Gully, 2008) to the evolution­
ary novelty of our statistical decision rules 
for a task (predicting others' behavior) as 
old as man himself (Colarel!i & Thompson, 
2008). Klimoski and jones (2008) argued to 
also consider the context of personnel selec­
tion. Already conceptualized (Kiehe, 2004) 
and pro�en useful (Konig et al., 201 0) for 
personnel selection in general, this com­
mentary tries to apply this idea to IPA in 
particular. 
Caught Between Multiple 
Stakehplders 
Following their financial and social objec­
tives, psychological assessors face many 
competil71g stakeholders. Compliance with 
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the demands of scientific and professional 
communities, client organizations, and 
candidates tested raises prestige, stability, 
legitimacy, professional acceptan�e, soda! 
support, access to resources, attraction of 
personnel, and invulnerability to question­
ing. Yet, given their multitude and conflict­
ing nature, no decision maker caln satisfy 
all demands at once-and will thus adopt, 
compromise, avoid, defy, or even manip­
ulate demands in striving toward overall 
stability and legitimacy (Oiiver, 1991 ). 
The Community 
The scientific and professional community, 
addressed in fOP, offers stability and legit­
imacy by creating incremental knowledge 
and refining the boundaries up to vvhich this 
knowledge will hold true (see Silzer and 
Jeanneret's ea!! for "assessment databases 
... available to researchers ... to study ... 
key research issues and policy issues"). Sci­
ence a!so creates legitimacy by impacting 
best-practice recommendations and norms 
(e.g., !SO) and by setting standards for 
accreditations and licensing. In return, the 
community requires adherence to certain 
rules, for example, acknowledging empiri­
cal findings and resulting advice of earlier 
work (e.g., on the value of critical incidents, 
general mental ability [GMA], and mechan­
ical integration) and providing empirical 
proof that any delineation from such advice 
is of incremental value. 
Clients 
Our community may have opinioQs, but it 
does not pay the bills. Rather, dient orga­
nizations, themselves often amateurs in iPA 
(Smith & Howard, 2009), hire psychologists 
in the hope that the resulting !PA '�is based 
on sound psychological principles, theory, 
and research" (Si!zer & Jeanneret), that is, 
backed by the above scientific community. 
Yet in the end, clients' willingness (financial 
resources allowing) to invest into long-term 
cooperations with assessors also for later 
vacancies is primarily a question not of 
scientific backing but of whether the assess­
ment appears "insightful and accurate" 
U.-C. Kfehe 
and if it adds "significant value to the 
selection process," thus promising to be 
"a sound and useful investment" (Si!zer & 
jeanneret). This may be particularly true 
when a selection is part of a comprehen­
sive succession management process (Day, 
2009) and when organizational decision 
makers gain the impression that the assessor 
understands and contributes to this long­
term perspective. 
Yet, client organizations, too, are subject 
to multiple conflicting demands. Thus, an 
organization may not strive for the objec­
tively best candidate, but for an easy, fast, 
and suitable solution for a pressing problem 
(Kiimoski & jones, 2008). Long-term eco­
nomic benefits are thus often discounted 
in the face of certain short-term costs, and 
organizations tarry to invest the money and 
manpower needed for preparing a solid IPA 
with no guarantees given about the resulting 
recommendation's tenor or eventual suc­
cess (Kiehe, 2004; Konig et al., 201 0). 
In addition, executive decision making 
happens in a highly politicized environ­
ment. Within organizations, different stake­
holders hold different interests, and a new 
executive will not only need to fit to the 
official requirements of the position but 
will also be decided upon on the basis 
of the unofficial political and power strug­
gles, coalitions, and competitions within the 
organization (Kraut, 2009; Oliver, 1991 ). 
In such politicized environment, a stan­
dardized, numeric, and directly compa­
rable IPA of different candidates might 
appear more threatening than helpfuL This 
also reflects Oliver's (1991) argument that 
organizations will try to resist institutional 
pressures perceived as constraining an orga­
nization's autonomy and Dipboye's (1994) 
argument that organizations often prefer 
unstructured selection procedures as the 
inherent ambiguity of unstructured proce­
dures may prevent scrutiny and monitoring 
of the selection process by outside parties, 
such as the HR department or governmental 
agencies. 
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Candidates 
Silzer and jeanneret argue that unstruc­
tured or semi structured interviews allow 
assessors to "probe and collect additional 
information relevant to a concern or a 
dimension" and to "pursue behavioral 
leads in an interview. They can adapt to 
new information and changing dynamics in 
the interview." Yet, candidates usually pre­
fer unstructured interviews, too, because 
they can set these leads: They see a 
greater control and ability to influence the 
desired outcome with unstructured, com­
pared to structured procedures (latham & 
Finnegan, 1993), conveying a consistent 
and well-crafted picture of themselves. The 
resulting report then easily suggests that 
the assessment psychologists really know 
this person-but reflects a negotiated out­
come more than an independent assess­
ment. Thus, particularly because executive 
candidates are both assessment savvy (Silzer 
& jeanneret) and are used to making com­
plex and wide-reaching decisions based on 
insufficient information (Sma!ley, 2009), the 
use of structured procedures is so important, 
even though negotiated "round" stories 
may more easily find the approval of both 
candidates and of the clients requesting an 
insightful profile. 
Particularly candidates aware of their 
high societal-and soon likely organiza­
tional-status may demand a sense of 
appreciation and welcome, and doomed 
is thus the assessor who smudges a positive 
impression of a dient organization. Appli­
cants infer an organization's values, beliefs, 
and assumptions from the selection process 
(e.g., French, 1987; Murphy & Davidshofer, 
1991; Rynes, Heneman, & Schwab, 1980; 
Schneider, 1972) and prefer interview­
ers who are attentive, warm, thoughtful, 
socially perceptive, and likeable in the way 
they run the interview (Dipboye, 1992)-all 
of which is easier to accomplish during 
an unstructured or maybe a semistruc­
tured interview than during a more struc­
tured interview. Unstructured procedures 
also facilitate other aspects of perceived 
fairness, such as opportunity to perform, 
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a two-wav communication, and a higher 
degree ot' interaction, thus easing some of 
the unnaturalness, uneasiness, and stiffness 
of the selection process, and facilitating the 
process for both parties (Dipboye, 1994). 
For this reason, too, candidates usually pre­
fer unstructured procedures over structured 
ones (Conwav & Peneno, 1999; Schuler, ' I 
1992), and unstructured interviews in par-
ticular can serve as recruitment tools just as 
much as selection tools. 
Context and Competition 
Research on the mimetic view of organi­
zational conformity (DiMaggio & Powelt 
1983; Toibert & Zucker, 1983) shows that 
the diffusion of a practice or belief influ­
ences its perceived legitimacy and hence 
adoption. That is, when institutional rules 
or norms are broadly diffused, they reflect 
taken-for-granted understandings of what 
constitutes legitimate or rational behavior, 
and their social validitv is hard!v ques-
' I 
tioned. Organizations may even conform 
because it does not occur to them to do 
otherwise. This is less likely to happen 
when specific practices are not that com­
mon. Silzer and jeanneret's ''reservations 
about executive search consulting firms 
using individual assessments to advocate for 
and promote their candidates to client orga­
nizations" are thus fu!iy warranted, yet this 
competition is not only eating a rather large 
chunk of the lucrative cake (e.g., Smith & 
Howard, 2009) but is also setting the tone 
and implicit expectations about the pre­
dictability of performance. 
As Silzer and Jeanneret imply, a core 
issue in the competition with headhunters 
lies in their different business model: Unlike 
psychological assessors interested in as 
objective and essentially neutral an IPA as 
possib!e, most headhunters only get paid 
once they manage to make organizational 
decision makers fall in love with their 
chosen candidate and vice versa (Fin!ay & 
Coverdill, 2002). The resulting grooming of 
and sales pitch for the proposed candidate 
then often implies a far greater belief in 
the validity of the recommendation made 
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than any serious psychologist would be 
able to defend on scientific grounds. Faced 
with the dilemma betvveen scientifically 
appropriate modesty on the one hand and 
the knowledge of the own professions' 
superiority for predicting performance on 
the other hand, not to speak of own 
business interests, psychologists can either 
try to discredit their competition (likely 
not a very fruitful endeavor, given the 
dissemination of headhunters in executive 
placement) or give in to the easily shared 
myths about the predictability of human 
behavior (H ighhouse, 2008), thus further 
strengthening these myths. 
Besides numerous psychological (High­
house, 2008) and even evolutionary 
(Colarel!i & Thompson, 2008) reasons for 
using the latter approach, organizational 
theory suggests that it will also be fostered 
by the innate nature of the task at hand. 
After a!!, executive jobs are highly complex, 
and predicting executive performance is an 
uncertain, risky, if not dose to impossible 
task (Si!zer, 2005; Smal!ey, 2009) .. Particu­
larly under conditions of uncertainty, how­
ever, when future states of the world cannot 
be anticipated and accurately predicted 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), organizations 
(i.e., here assessment experts) exert great 
effort to reestablish real or at least perceived 
control and stability. They tend to overes­
timate the certainty of their decisions and 
become more likely to imitate other orga­
nizations in their field (DiMaggio & Powel!, 
1983; Gaiaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). 
Fina!!y, headhunters hold still another 
advantage over assessment psychologists by 
being an excellent tool in the politicized 
environment of executive decisions. After 
all, it is not the organization overall, 
but only their direct client (e.g., the 
hiring department), whom headhunters 
need to serve to make an income. in 
this, headhunters fulfil! numerous buffering 
roles also between departments within 
the same organization (e.g., shielding 
an organization's hiring department from 
the HR department [Finlay & Coverdi!l, 
2002]), thus serving as a powerful tool in 
organizational politics. A professional and 
U.-C. Klehe 
truly neutral psychological assessor will be 
unable (and one might argue unwilling) to 
fulfil! such a role. 
Content 
Organizations react to some pressures with 
more resistance than to others. This hap­
pens, first, when a pressure constrains 
a decision maker's perceived autonomy 
(Oiiver, 1991 ), and past research on per­
sonnel selection suggests that this effect 
hampers the dissemination of structured 
selection procedures. !t happens, second, 
when the pressure's content conflicts with 
the organizations' own economic and social 
objectives. 
Economically, psychological assessors 
want to win and keep a piece of the lucrative 
business of IPA while containing the costs 
involved (e.g., for using external testing 
materia!). This in turn raises the importance 
of satisfying clients, finding acceptance with 
candidates, and outperforming (or at least 
appearing to outperform) the competition. 
Endorsement by the professional commu­
nity, in turn, will contribute only indirectly 
to the business at hand by further enhancing 
the assessment psychologist's professional 
credibility. 
Socially, however, we might deal with 
nothing less than our professional identity. 
This identity influences how we react to 
different IPA procedures and what proce­
dures we want to see endorsed (or not) 
by official norms and during professional 
education and licensure. Silzer and jean­
neret express a clinically rooted identity 
when they note that "We believe that we 
are in fact psychologists and that psycho­
logical judgment is critical to IPA" and 
that "some assessors have a natural interest 
and curiosity about people. They are bet­
ter observers of human behavior and notice 
subtle actions and people differences. They 
naturally start assembling their own behav­
ioral norms by observing others . . . .  whereas 
other assessors seem more mechanistic 
and show weaker behavioral observations 
skills." Taking this perspective, structured 
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interviews may feel monotonous and bor­
ing without allowing to build a rapport with 
the interviewee (Dipboye, 1994; Harris, 
2000)-and it may even cail to question as 
to whether one needs a psychology degree 
to run them. Yet believing in the ernpirical 
science of psychology (and hating that lame 
"Psvcholo0oist? So vou can read mv mind!" I I I 
pickup linet I'd counter"! believe that ... 
the use of empirical ps_vchofogical findings 
is critical to IPA"-and would thus find it 
irresponsible to waste decades of practice 
and hundreds of second-rate advices into 
the development of an assessment expertise 
that may be modestly better than no exper­
tise at ail (Speng!er et al., 2009), but hardly 
better than the statistical results obtainable 
on Day 1 (fEgisd6ttir et al., 2006). Similarly, 
either side could now passionately argue 
about the validity of these claims-which 
brings us to the section on how to handle 
an these conflicting pressures. 
Reactions to Organizational 
Pressures 
Given the rather diverging calls by differ­
ent stakeholders on how IPA should look, 
assessors face the strategic choice to acquit, 
compromise, avoid, defy, or even manip­
ulate any of these pressures. Acquiescence 
includes conscious compliance {e.g., rely­
ing on a well-validated GMA-test rather 
than assessing "smarts" via an unstructured 
interview) or imitation (e.g., imitating a suc­
cessful competitor's sales pitch) and can 
also just result from habit and/or rituals (as 
has been argued to be the case with many 
unstructured interviews [Dipboye, 1994]). 
When the multiplicity and conflict­
ing nature of institutional pressures make 
acquiescence impossible, however, orga­
nizations rnay attempt to compromise by 
balancing, pacifying, or bargaining with 
external constituents (Oiiver, 1991 ). An 
example for balancing the need of sci­
entific validity with assessors' desires to 
rely on clinical judgments would be 
Kuncel's (2008) recommendation to only 
present carefully prescreened candidates 
to decision makers or to use certain data 
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combination methods that permit expert 
input without seriously impairing the test's 
validity. Pacifying implies trying to appease 
or placate the source of the institutional 
pressure, for example, by acknowledging 
how "knowledge about assessment cen­
ters and related research can provide useful 
insights and guidance on how !PAs can be 
further improved" (Si!zer & Jeanneret). At 
other moments, Silzer and jeanneret out­
right bargain about the conditions, few as 
those may be, when clinical assessors may 
do as we!l and possibly better than sta­
tistical procedures-not a trivial debate if 
one considers the social identity attached 
to this question, together with the need 
to agree upon scientifically sound stan­
dards for professional training and !icen­
sure. And aithough strenuous, such bar­
gaining wi!l serve the discipline consid­
erably better than avoiding the issue by 
concealing nonconformity (e.g., by design­
ing a structured test and then not using 
it), escaping from institutional pressures 
(e.g., by leaving the professional associa­
tion), or buffering, that is, reducing exter­
nal inspection, scrutinizing or evaluation 
(a strategic response that has been associ­
ated with the use of poorly documented 
and unstandardized selection procedures 
[Dipboye, 1994]). And as such, bargain­
ing is also highly preferable to reactions 
of defiance, that is, the unequivocal rejec­
tion of an institutional pressure by just 
dismissing, challenging, and attacking it, 
which would only further the division 
between proponents of either side within 
our discipline. 
Where we might end up with more furi­
ous debates, however, is when it comes to 
the manipulation of standards, that is, the 
active attempt to change or exert power 
over the content or the sources of insti­
tutional pressures, be it through cooption, 
control, or influence. In this regard, l fully 
agree with Silzer and jeanneret in their call 
for more research and faculty involvement 
in the research on and training of IPA. Thus, 
although I do not share their perspective 
on the validitv of clinical IPA, ! do see 
f 
such involvement necessary, because-a!! 
316 
complexities aside-whoever doesn't help 
row the boat likely also has little say in the 
direction that it's rowing toward. 
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